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Introduction
Somali pirates often come to mind when considering modern maritime piracy. Since
2012, however, effective action and intervention by the international community have greatly
suppressed the threat of Somali piracy in East African waters. Many are unaware, due to underreporting and lack of global media attention, of the current and now more prominent threat of
West African piracy concentrated within the Gulf of Guinea. Recent reports and trends indicate
that these waters have become the most dangerous in the world for international shipping and
seafaring considering the extent in which West African piracy “threatens the safety of navigation
and inflicts billions of dollars of economic losses.” 1 The period between early 2016 and March
2018 has seen an increase in crew kidnapping as a primary strategy for profit-motivated pirates
in the region. Kidnapping and ransom tactics are the costliest byproduct of piracy and most
concerning for humanitarian reasons.
In 2011, the UN recognized the problem of general piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf
of Guinea. However, the international community and regional authorities have failed to deter
this problem thus far. I will compare this situation to the successful dealings with piracy in
Somalia, of which existing conditions and adaptations of law allowed for international
involvement to restore order and eliminate the feasibility of the crime. Anti-piracy in the Gulf of
Guinea has unfortunately been ineffective due to international law conflicting with domestic
laws and politics. I will discuss several issues, such as jurisdictional limitations, ineffective
criminal justice in local courts, complex local politics, and ambiguity regarding the application
of piracy and terrorism laws, to demonstrate the complexity and ineffectiveness of current
1
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actions. I will conclude that, although both East and West African piracy emerged as a result of
“weak states,” the contradictions and limitations of international law have created a sustainable
climate for piracy to flourish in West Africa.
The evolution of piracy under the law has been studied extensively. In The Enemy of All:
Piracy and the Law of Nations, Daniel Heller-Roazen considers the development of anti-piracy
an exceptional subject in international law. He takes into account the uniqueness of the high seas
region, the blurring distinction between criminal and political categories, and the historic
definition of pirates as an “enemy of all” in this assessment. Heller-Roazen argues that despite
modern technology, piracy is an ageless crime through “the process of piratical adaption.” 2 He
does so by contrasting a 1924 Harvard Law Review article titled “Is the crime of Piracy
Obsolete?” with statistics indicating piracy growth in the early 21st century. 3 In Sea Power: The
History and Geopolitics of the World’s Oceans, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander
Admiral James Stavridis agrees that “often the case in fighting transnational threats, when the
international community is able to address it in a given area, it often pops up in another.” 4
Political scientist and RAND Corporation security analyst Peter Chalk assesses both piracy and
political terrorism in Grey-area Phenomena in Southeast Asia: Piracy, Drug Trafficking and
Political Terrorism. He assesses these new age security challenges as “grey area” threats. These
are threats to the stability of sovereign states, as well as their established economic institutions,
by non-state actors 5.
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Some argue that “push factors” and sanctuaries of weakened authority create conditions
in which piracy can occur and thrive. Chalk, for example, considers piracy partly a response to
land-based “push factors” such as poverty, inequality and lack of opportunity. In Contemporary
Piracy and Maritime Terrorism, Martin N. Murphy argues that the inability or unwillingness of
weak states to provide adequate maritime security allows for “maritime disorder” to occur, for
example, in the port of Lagos, Nigeria. 6 Many international security experts including Murphy
and Chalk agree that piracy and crime flourish when weak authority fails to deny sanctuaries, or
“safe havens,” for organized criminal groups. These sanctuaries can emerge from any factors that
may weaken authority, such as lack of resources/technology, corruption, and/or conflicts
between international and domestic law. An example of the latter is a period in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries in which privateering, or state-sponsored piracy, thrived within a
“sanctuary” of ambiguous international norms.
This thesis will consider incentivizing “push factors” in Chapter 2, but emphasize lack of
deterrence under the law. The piratical adaptation and sanctuary arguments guide my analysis.
Sanctuary for Somali pirates were a result of the void of power left by the Somalia “failed-state,”
but were quickly suppressed when international actors intervened and overcame legal challenges.
However, conditions in West Africa have created a local sanctuary for piracy, while limitations
of international law have further shielded international intervention and the restoration of
authority.
I use a variety of sources for my thesis. Primary sources include news articles, public
databases (primarily the International Maritime Bureau Annual Report on Piracy and Armed
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Robbery against Ships), private risk assessment and security reports, government documents and
speeches, court documents and transcripts, a documentary, reports and statements from the
United Nations, and international treaties such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation.
The thesis begins by examining the development of international maritime law in the
context of piracy. Chapter one provides a brief history of anti-piracy law and a description of
several international legal institutions that have been used to fight piracy, such as the 1856
Declaration of Paris, 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), international
definitions for piracy and relevant background information. Chapter 2 introduces the analogous
economic conditions for would-be criminals and sanctuaries of weak authority that have allowed
Somali piracy and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea to emerge. Chapter 3 examines the successful
methods in which the international community was able to effectively suppress Somali piracy. It
contrasts these methods to the current conditions and responses in West Africa, demonstrating
the complexity of anti-piracy law in the Gulf of Guinea. It demonstrates that the restrictive and
protective elements of international law have created jurisdictional obstacles that prevent foreign
intervention in the territorial waters of West African nations. The chapter also looks at criminal
justice by addressing the relationship between international maritime law and local criminal
laws. Lastly, the chapter considers the relationship between pirates, local politics and law,
questioning the political aims of pirates and the extent in which terrorism plays a role in West
African piracy.

8

Chapter 1
International Maritime Law and Anti-Piracy

9

Origins of Maritime Law
For centuries, empires, monarchies, and principalities regulated maritime activities such
as travel, fishing, military activity, trade, and other forms of commerce as part of their landbased legal systems. With the entire Mediterranean sea under control of the Roman Empire, early
western maritime law developed in a comprehensive and uniform fashion. The first examples
date back to the “Rhodian Sea Law” in the seventh and eighth centuries. 7 As part of the Justinian
Code the law emphasized the compensation of lost goods rather than the persecution of pirates.
After the fall of the Roman Empire, local authorities and small port cities along the
Mediterranean coast played a key role in developing their own civil codes and were the primary
administrators and enforcers of these laws. During the Roman and medieval period, piracy was
predominantly a concern of civil law, or the settlement of disputes and compensation between
private citizens.
In the fifteenth century, however, improved sailing vessels, navigation devices, and
cartography made it possible for western monarchies and states to search for new markets and
establish global trade routes. Portuguese, Spanish, and later, English and Dutch vessels began
pushing further into vast and unclaimed waters while creating interaction with unfamiliar
peoples. As state building began to take shape in the seventeenth century, maritime law became
public law with the emergence of national Admiralty Courts. The term “admiralty” began to
refer to the jurisdiction and procedural courts of law under the office of the Admiral. 8 Courts
such as the French Admiralty Court and the English High Court of Admiralty developed the

7
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authority to administer “criminal, private, procedural, and public laws relating to the sea.” 9 For
example, piracy became a criminal offense under Henry VIII’s Offense at Sea Act of 1536 10 and
the prosecutions of individuals suspected of piracy, or armed robbery on the high seas, were
handled within these national legal frameworks.
As international conflicts at sea continued to increase, however, transnational politics and
imperial pursuits greatly influenced the outcome of maritime legal disputes. The use of
privateering is an example of this controversy between national interests and international law.
While nations were at war, Admiralty courts began issuing “letters of marque” that allowed
private citizens to legally engage in privateering, or state-sponsored piracy expeditions, against
enemy vessels. Privateering thus became a legal outlet for piracy in a period of ambiguity and
conflict between public “laws of war,” domestic criminal and private civil law. This issue would
eventually question the authority of national Admiralty courts and demand a more collaborative
international system of settling disputes at sea. At the conclusion of the Crimean War, the
multilateral Declaration of Paris (1856) would advance new principles of international maritime
law. Specifically, the agreement declared privateering illegal, encouraged the regulation of
civilized warfare at sea, affirmed the rights to neutral shipping, and created universal jurisdiction
for the pursuit of piracy. 11
Demand for developing maritime law meant addressing questions surrounding the
legitimacy of national jurisdiction and theoretical boundaries at sea. Despite many states’
overzealous claims on “possessing” extraterritorial waters, the oceans were lawless frontiers
9
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greatly outside the physical reach of national authorities. The presence of actors from diverse
national and political backgrounds further complicated the matter. For these reasons, maritime
law and the regulation of disputes at sea remained an issue of international scope. Jurists such as
Hugo Grotius discussed the limits of jurisdiction, boundaries and international law at sea. In his
publication Mare Liberum (“The Free Seas”- 1609), Grotius argued that the oceans are too vast
to be properly controlled by a single political authority, introducing the theory of international
territory at sea as well as freedom of trade and transit. 12 Similarly, Emmerich de Vattel notes that
“ownership, properly defined, consists of the right to occupy a thing” and due to the inhabitable
nature of the sea, “no one can establish himself in the open seas in a manner as to exclude others
from passing through them.” 13 Daniel Heller-Roazen considered the indiscriminate nature of
piracy a violation of the principle of the right of every nation to use the open seas and therefore a
crime that “insults all nations.” Pirates were deemed a “common enemy of all” and the crime
became one of the first “crimes against humanity” under international law. 14 The “universal
jurisdiction” principle, therefore, grants authority to all nations to pursue and apprehend pirates
found acting within international waters, regardless of national background. This collective
enforcement mechanism within a shared maritime space demonstrates the evolution of maritime
law to address the problem of piracy.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) is the most recent
development in international maritime and modern piracy law. According to its preamble, the
12
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treaty was intended to create mutual understanding and settle issues related to the law of the sea.
The agreement established an up-to-date legal order through the codification and progressive
development of sea laws for the “strengthening of peace, security, cooperation and friendly
relations among all nations.” 15 Because the treaty offers a universal doctrine of international
maritime law, it is described informally as the “constitution for the oceans.” 16 The specific need
for the development of UNCLOS must be traced back to the history of international maritime
law and the gaps left by previous multilateral treaties to deal with the controversies surrounding
jurisdiction, domestic policies and piracy.
Convened in 1973, UNCLOS III entailed an extensive negotiating process to correct
previous uncertainties and address developing issues. The introduction of several new
provisions, such as the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), seemed to satisfy the majority
of nations seeking clarity on the territorial debate. Interestingly, the conference and drafting
procedures were negotiated on the basis of consensus rather than the traditional method of
majority vote. This process forced nations with divergent interests to make “every effort to reach
agreement on substantive matters by way of consensus” before being put to vote. 17 Under this
protocol, the negotiation process was deemed a great success and model for future multilateral
treaty formation.
A key component of the treaty is the principle of “universal participation.” Under this
principle, ratification implies the party consents to be bound by its provisions without expressing

15
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any reservations or undertake actions to undermine the treaty. This package deal, the all-ornothing concept, is a significant achievement in international multilateral treaty law, especially
considering the impressive number of participants and signatories. The success is credited in
large part to the successful procedures involving the consensus decision-making process, as well
as a post-draft “Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI.” Then UN-Secretary
General Cuéllar considered UNCLOS “possibly the most significant legal instrument of this
century.” 18

UNCLOS: The Definition of International Piracy
The definition of the crime of piracy is contained in article 101 of UNCLOS, which reads as follows:

''Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private
ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on
board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any
State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or
(b).''

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) thus created a strict legal
definition of international piracy. This framework is vital for assessing cases of piracy when
18
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applied in domestic courts. Recognized as customary international law, many national or
“domestic” courts (such as the United States and Kenya) have adopted this framework for
criminal proceedings of suspected pirates. The definition creates several principles and specific
requirements for the apprehension and prosecution of international pirates. One example is the
codification of the “universal jurisdiction” principle, which grants all nations jurisdiction to
arrest suspected pirates on the the high seas. Nations have to meet five requirements to apply the
law in criminal proceedings: a “violence” requirement, a “private ends” requirement, a “private
ship” requirement, a “two ships” requirement and a “high seas” requirement. 19 These strict
criteria, in conjunction with other provisions of UNCLOS (such as the role of jurisdictional
boundaries), have occasionally limited anti-piracy law in criminal prosecutions and the law
enforcement efforts of international actors. Two of these requirements, the “high seas”
requirement and the “private ends” requirement, are particularly controversial for cases of West
African piracy.
Anti-piracy stipulations in international and domestic are mutually dependent. Despite
international codification, piracy is considered a transnational crime and not currently applied in
any international courts such as the International Criminal Court (ICC). Therefore, domestic
courts are essential for implementing and administering international law. The UNCLOS
definition of piracy in article 101 provides a framework that can be applied to domestic courts
for this purpose. But national legislatures occasionally fail to enact laws that appropriately
address piracy and to create conditions for effective prosecution.
The “High Seas” Requirement, Territorial Boundaries and Jurisdictional Limits

19
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Hugo Grotius demanded the sea to remain free from national claims, creating an
international and theoretical zone void of sovereign authority. This concept was reaffirmed under
the Declaration of Paris (1856) and future multilateral treaties. However, section 2, part II of
UNCLOS challenges this principle by authorizing the historic claim of proximate territorial
waters as national boundaries, at the discretion of a state “up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical
miles” 20 from a coastal baseline. These territorial boundaries set the limits between domestic and
international jurisdiction, intending to protect the national sovereignty against infringement of
foreigners. The boundaries are also intended to establish a reasonable national jurisdiction by
creating a zone in which a State can sufficiently administer justice. In addition to a 12-mile
reach, any internal waters within the coastal baselines, such as rivers, harbors, and canals, are
also considered exclusive jurisdictional zones for national authorities. Under these provisions,
national authorities have exclusive sovereignty and the right to police, enforce and regulate
activities internal or territorial waters at their discretion. The UNCLOS framework also sets
guidelines involving the presence of foreign vessels in territorial waters, allowing only for a
“continuous and expeditious” form of “innocent passage.” 21 These jurisdictional boundaries
affect both the right to police and enforce laws, such as lawful arrests and seizures, and the legal
basis for judicial proceedings of civil and criminal law. The boundaries have significantly
impacted anti-piracy law, such as placing limitations on international intervention and
jurisdiction in these zones.

20
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Chapter 2
Somali Piracy (2006-14) and the Current Issue in the Gulf of
Guinea

“We must take further concrete steps designed to eradicate piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, which
constitutes a clear threat to the security and economic development…[of West Africa states,
SC]”
- B. Lynn Pascoe, UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, February 27, 2012

He [Abdullah Hussain Haroon, Representative of Pakistan to the UN, SC] underlined the
importance of urgently countering the phenomenon in the Gulf to “prevent the situation from
getting out of hand.”
- 6723rd UN Security Council Meeting, Briefings, February 27, 2012

17

I.

Trends of Modern Piracy in Africa
Maritime piracy reached headline news during a surge of reported incidents in the Gulf of

Aden in 2006-2011. The notorious hijackings of the Japanese-flagged Golden Nori and the U.S.flagged Maersk Alabama received considerable international attention. An unstable economic
and political situation in Somalia caused maritime piracy to reach “unprecedented proportions”
in the modern age. 22 The international community recognized that Somali piracy was a serious
threat to shipping industries and global trade based on the location and frequency of the attacks.
Demands for a swift and firm response resulted in an unprecedented international collaboration
that applied a multitude of resources; including new incident-reporting and information-sharing
techniques, safer shipping practices, international and transnational agreements on effective
criminal prosecution, and a colossal investment in a multinational warship fleet to police piratethreatened waters. Although intensive and costly, the response was incredibly effective. In
2012, the number of reported attacks had dropped by nearly 300%. By 2015, just four years
since the peak of annual attacks, Somali piracy was virtually eliminated.
With piracy in the international spotlight and the Somali threat in decline, attention
shifted across Africa to the Gulf of Guinea (GoG). In November 2011, the United Nations sent
an “assessment mission on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea” to “consider the possibility of
establishing a mechanism to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea similar to the anti-piracy
regime currently in place off the coast of Somalia.” 23 In 2012, the United Nations adopted
Resolution 2039 “expressing its deep concern about the threat that piracy and armed robbery at

22
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sea in the Gulf of Guinea pose to international navigation, security and the economic
development of states in the region.” 24 The council and participating members agreed that piracy
was becoming enough of “a serious threat” to demand actions “countering the threat and
addressing the underlying causes.” Although the 2011 assessment mission report correctly
identified that piracy in the region was “not a new phenomenon” and was perhaps overlooked by
the international community, the report declared that “since 2010, incidents of piracy and armed
robbery in the area have risen significantly.” 25 The UN Security Council also declared in 2012
that the attacks were becoming “more violent and systematic.” Resolution 2039 (2012) not only
identified the issue, but was the first of many international and regional attempts (discussed in
Chapter 3) to bolster “regional coordination and logistical support to regional security initiatives”
to fight West African piracy. 26
The effective suppression of Somali piracy resulting in a worldwide decline in annual
attacks should not be overlooked. Recent headlines such as “Safety on the High Seas” (CNBC)
and “Maritime piracy in 2017 reached a 22-year low” (International Chamber of Commerce)
strike optimism for global maritime security but fail to consider the adaptive nature of piracy.
Six years have now passed since the UN Security Council identified an “urgent need to devise
and adopt effective and practical measures to counter piracy in the Gulf of Guinea” in Resolution
2039 (2012), but piracy continues to trouble the region and international community. 27 A
January 2018 statement by International Maritime Bureau director Pottengal Mukundan
confirms: “Although the number of attacks is down this year in comparison with last year, the

24
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Gulf of Guinea and the waters around Nigeria remain a threat to seafarers.” 28 The region now
represents one-sixth of global piracy incidents within the 2017 review period. 29 Additionally,
concerned regional experts indicate that the number of attacks are frequently underestimated.
Since early 2018, they have increased and pirates are shifting to more problematic tactics such as
kidnapping. This chapter compares the conditions of piracy in Somali to those in the Gulf of
Guinea to underscore the flexible nature of piracy that, as the next chapter will explain, makes it
harder for the international community to respond with a “one-for-all” antidote against piracy.
II.

Conditions of Somali Piracy

Despite modern technology, the rise of Somali piracy in the twenty-first century revealed
a shockingly insecure and venerable reality of global trade on the high seas. The rise of this
phenomenon can be attributed to multiple factors. Poverty and economic hardship in Somalia
created what piracy scholars call land-based or ‘push’ factors that encourage young men to resort
to a lifestyle of criminality at sea. 30 Foreign intrusion in local fishing hampers legitimate
employment opportunities for Somalis, while fueling anti-western sentiment and recourse. In
addition, local political instability created conditions that weakened authority and law
enforcement, allowing pirates to be uncontested and finding a sanctuary to thrive in. These
conditions, combined with the convenient geography of the Gulf of Aden as a bottleneck for
global trade routes, cultivated a prime opportunity for the illegal industry to succeed.

28
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The severity of the Somali issue was described as reaching “epidemic proportions” not
“seen since the Barbary wars of the nineteenth century.” 31 Piracy data collected by the
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) distributed in quarterly and annual reports provide
valuable quantitative insight for regional and global piracy trends. These reports reveal the rapid
growth and scale of Somali piracy between 2007 and 2011. In 2007, for example, there were 51
attempted or successful pirate attacks in waters adjacent to Somalia, already putting Somalia on
the map as a major piracy global hotspot. 32 Yet that number would multiply to 216 in the
calendar year of 2009. The peak of the phenomenon occurred in 2011, in which the IMB
reported 237 attacks attributed to Somali pirates. 33 Based on this figure, an attack would occur
roughly every 35 hours.
Two decades of civil war and political instability in Somalia created destructive
humanitarian conditions that enabled and encouraged the rise of piracy. The collapse of the
socialist regime in 1991 resulted in a fragmented state in which multiple factions claimed
authority. Subsequent civil wars resulted in a humanitarian crisis involving violence,
displacement, famine, lawlessness, and general poverty. 34 In response to claims that Somalia
had become “the world’s most utterly ‘failed state’,” 35 the UN Security Council authorized
intervention of multiple peacekeeping and humanitarian aid missions between 1992 and 1995.
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With an estimated three million people “threatened with starvation,” 36 desperate coastal
populations suffering from poverty and famine began “resorting to illegal activities to obtain
basic needs.” 37 For a region accustomed to armed conflict, weaponry was cheap and readily
available; an AK-47 machine-gun could regularly be exchanged for three cows. 38 Piracy offered
lucrative returns for these struggling communities; the ransom of one hijacked ship meant “the
potential to earn US$1-2 million.” 39 Elliot Anderson has examined how the influx of this ransom
money created capital injections that benefited local Somali shopkeepers and businesses. He
credits piracy for creating a unique illegal industry, reforming the Somali coastal economy, and
for enabling families to put food on the table. 40
Lack of authority and political fragmentation in the Somali “failed state” left the
coastlines unregulated by domestic forces, meaning piracy and other criminal activity would not
be contested. Insecurity and piracy in Somali waters were first recognized by the International
Maritime Bureau in the 2005 annual report. Captain Pottengal Mukundan, Director of the IMB,
indicated that Somali pirates were becoming “increasingly audacious” and cited “the utter lack of
law enforcement infrastructure in the area… leaving far too many vessels and mariners
unprotected.” 41 After three more years of weak and unstable governance, Somalia would be
upgraded to the most significant piracy “hot spot” in the world in modern history. The
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fragmentation of governance not only allowed piracy to occur but often encouraged it through
corruption and complacency. Local leaders were sometimes investing in piracy endeavors for
personal financial reasons. 42 The benefit of piracy to local economies and communities gave
statesmen in coastal Somalia greater reason to deny its illegality.
The devastation of coastal fisheries, caused by the absence of a maritime authority to bar
foreign fishers, is often linked to the rise of Somali piracy. A “non-functioning government and
the complete lack of naval force” allowed foreign fishing vessels to illegally fish within Somali
territorial waters. The illegal dumping of toxic waste by foreign governments, causing
significant environmental degradation, further explains the depletion of these offshore
fisheries. 43 Lacking other channels of enforcement or recourse, Somali fishermen began taking
matters into their own hands through vigilante justice: equipping themselves and attacking
foreign fishing expeditions in an attempt at driving them away from the coast. 44 Scholars
disagree on how important these fishermen vigilantes were in the formation of Somali pirate
gangs. Nonetheless, degradation of fisheries contributed to anti-foreign sediment and piracy
activities offered new employment for an increasing number of struggling fishermen.
The geographic importance of the Gulf of Aden and Horn of Africa for international
shipping created waters “conducive to pirate activity.” 45 Shipping lanes leading into the Red Sea
are among the busiest in the world; the Suez Canal strategically connects the Mediterranean Sea
and Indian Ocean. In addition to high volume, the Gulf of Aden and Horn of the Africa act as a
natural bottleneck for inbound and outbound ships which creates a high density of traffic.
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Figures amount to 22,000 ships passing through the Gulf of Aden annually, and roughly 12% of
the world’s petroleum sources. 46 Struggling Somali communities watched “hundreds of billions
worth of commodities” sail past their coasts annually. Highly adaptive and organized pirates
divided into reconnaissance, attack and holding teams onboard high-speed fishing skiffs had no
trouble locating potential targets despite being situated several hundred miles offshore. 47 Pirates
identified unarmed merchant ships and boarded with the intention of capturing the entire vessel
and crewmembers for ransom. Once under control, pirates would usually guide captured ships
into Somali “safe-haven” ports and establish communication with shipping companies to receive
payment. 48 For many ship owners and insurance companies, simply paying ransoms became the
quickest and safest way to release crewmembers and their vessels. In turn, this complacency
fueled the piracy industry in coastal Somalia, as gangs were known to “rely on kidnapping and
hostage
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Somali piracy was an act of desperation driven by major push factors of unemployment
and poverty. Some scholars argue that Somalis had “some legitimate grievances” 50 due to
foreign intrusion and environmental degradation of coastal fisheries, and consider them the
“robin hoods of the sea.” 51 A unique illegal industry emerged as pirates carefully selected
passing targets, captured, and ransomed crew members and the vessel through negotiation.
Ransom money generated large profits that flowed into the local economies and back into future
pirate campaigns. The lack of political authority in coastal Somalia allowed for the pirate
organizations to establish bases, venture into international waters and retreat back to safe havens.
Somali piracy thrived between 2007 to 2011 under this model until the international community
was able to intervene effectively.
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II. Conditions of Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
In a broad sense, the current motivations and operations of West African pirates appear
similar to their East African counterparts in Somalia. Land-based push factors such as a lack of
economic opportunity, desperation, and hardship drive the ascent of piracy. Criminal gangs are
well organized and target high-value assets, causing a disruption in international shipping and
commodities markets. However, there are significant differences between East and West African
conditions of piracy. The history, tactics, behaviors and location of GoG attacks differ
dramatically from Somali examples.
The Gulf of Guinea has been a noteworthy hotspot for piracy and maritime insecurity
since 2003 and perhaps longer. However, the United Nations only first acknowledged the issue
in 2011, because Somali piracy drew greater attention. West Africa is an important player,
however, for commodities markets such as oil. A large majority of attacks are concentrated near
the oil-rich Niger Delta region and waters adjacent to the Port of Lagos, one of Africa’s largest
and busiest ports. For this reason, Nigerian internal and territorial waters contain a bulk of the
Gulf of Guinea piracy, which has important implications for the enforcement of anti-piracy law.
Nigeria was first recognized by the IMB as a piracy hotspot prior to the generalization of the
“Gulf of Guinea” piracy issue. However, overlapping pirate activities and outreaching pirate
gangs pose a broad threat to vessels calling ports in other West African Nations such as Benin,
Togo, Ghana, Cameroon and the Ivory Coast. With consensus that “the waters off the coast of
West Africa are some of the most dangerous in the world to transit,” 52 the United Nations and
IMB began using the “Gulf of Guinea” label in 2011 as an umbrella term for all threats occurring
within the “hotbed” region.
52
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Trend analyses are particularly complicated and frequently debated in the case of GoG
piracy. In 2016 and 2017, incidents of GoG piracy were reported annually to be 42 and 36
attacks respectively, indicating a significant increase from the 2015 figures. Furthermore, the
first two months of 2018 have already reported 17 incidents in the region, nearly half of 2016’s
annual figure. 53 At first glance, GoG piracy trends seem trivial compared to the annual figures of
Somali piracy, which exceeded 200 for several years. However, analysts indicate current reports
do not provide the full picture, as underreporting and non-reporting of incidents of GoG piracy
hamper a full understanding of the problem. By some estimates, only one-third of attempted
attacks are properly reported to authorities. 54 For one, small-scale encounters, squirmishes and
pirate sightings are often overlooked. Additionally, reporting incidents has been unattractive for
private shipping companies due to potential costs such as rising insurance premiums and the
likelihood that investigations could delay ships at port or in transit. Furthermore, it is well known
that nothing “meaningful” will come of the post-incident investigations. 55 But underreporting
makes it difficult to assess the true magnitude of the issue and properly analyze trends overtime.
In response, the IMB in 2017 adopted a new mechanism known as the “Community of
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Reporting” to adjust for under-reporting issues. An alarming figure estimated 95 attempted
pirate attacks in 2017, 56 advocating that West African waters are in fact the most dangerous in
the world and certainly a significant issue.

Maritime insecurity in the GoG region has historically been a complex issue. Opposed to
the systematic and well-defined Somali ransom-based piracy operations, criminal maritime
activity in West Africa has occurred in much greater variety during the past several decades.
Piracy is part of a long list of economically-motivated crimes such as drug trafficking, illegal oil
bunkering, pipeline vandalism, poaching, and illegal fishing. 57 The discovery of oil reserves
within the past 25 years has made the region an important provider of oil to global markets,
accounting for almost 30 percent of US petroleum products and almost 40 percent of European
imports. 58 Nigeria alone exports 2.3 million barrels per day and is the sixth largest producer of
crude oil in the world. 59 Significant foreign investment in offshore and inshore drilling and port
infrastructure has turned the coastal zone in the GoG into “an economic lifeline to coastal and
landlocked West African countries, and is of strategic importance to the rest of the world.” 60

56

ICC International Maritime Bureau. "IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships -2017 Annual Report." pg 12
Onuoha, “Nigeria as a Microcosm,” pg 4.
58
Anyimadu, Adjoa. "Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Lessons Learned from the Indian Ocean." Africa
2013/02, July 2013. Accessed April 15, 2018. Chatham House: Royal Institute of International Affairs. pg 4.
59
"Economy: Nigeria." The World Factbook. April 09, 2018. Accessed April 15, 2018.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook.
60
Anyimadu, “Lessons Learned,” pg 2.
57

28

Despite recent economic growth and new connections to global commodities markets,
widespread poverty and unequal distribution of wealth among a largely uneducated population
create devastating socioeconomic conditions. Although signs indicate a growing middle class, it
is estimated that 62% of Nigeria’s 170 million people still live in “extreme poverty.” 61 Similar to
Somalia, trying economic conditions such as these among GoG nations create the motivation for
criminal activities targeting control over resources, making “resource-insurgency” a major
political threat in the region. 62
Despite the lack of accurate data, regional experts claim that GoG piracy is not only on
the rise, but becoming more problematic due to the changing tactics of pirates towards
kidnapping. Historically, the principal motivation of piracy in the GoG has been the robbery and
theft of crude oil and refined petroleum products. 63 Acting in local waterways and ports, pirates
are rushed to offload stolen goods and evade into the complex estuaries and internal waterways
in small, high-speed boats. Recently, however, pirate tactics have been shifting towards
kidnapping, a more lucrative and less logistically demanding heist. An article from February
2018 posted in Tanker: Shipping and Trade, a knowledgeable industry newsletter and forum,
warns of “piracy evolving” and “becoming a more significant problem” in the GoG region, as
criminals are “shifting focus to human crews.” 64 Unlike Somali pirates, who would mainly
hijack entire ships and guide them to “safe haven” ports in Somalia, GoG pirates are learning the
effectiveness of “snatch and grab” kidnapping in their regional environment. This model
involves removing hostages from vessels and oil infrastructure and bringing them back via
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speedboats into pirate havens in the vast Niger Delta region to demand ransom. Based on the
2017 IMB Piracy Annual Report, 65 of the 75 global crew kidnappings occurred in Nigeria.
These kidnapping tactics are more costly than stolen cargo due to high ransom demands and
significant insurance premium hikes. More problematic to the seafaring community are the
increasing threats to shipping crews that put human lives at stake. Furthermore, in addressing
crew kidnapping trends, analysts indicate it is “likely that these will develop further throughout
2018.” 65 So far, this seems to be the case; late January and early February 2018 saw two large
tankers attacked and their crews taken hostage.
The motivations behind GoG piracy are different compared to Somali piracy. Despite
functioning state authorities, there is political instability that seems to encourage the spread of
piracy. Similar to Somalia, the region is unstable, militarized and prone to civil conflict, which
contributes to the proliferation of the sales of small arms and light weapons. 66 Considering the
widespread use of violent criminal activities motivated by internal politics and “resourceinsurgency,” scholars have more quickly labelled West African piracy operations as “maritime
terrorism.” Militant and radical groups in the Niger Delta region are known to be more directly
involved in the financing of piracy operations for political gains. Former NATO Supreme Allied
Commander James Stavridis notes that the general rise of outlaw operations is “coupled with the
rise of Islamic radical groups like Boko Haram.” 67 Certainly, perpetrators of piracy in the region
have greater anti-authority rhetoric. Similar to Somalia, however, is the anti-foreign sentiment
among pirates. Niger delta gangs claim that oil and other multinational corporations exploit the
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wealth of natural resources that rightfully belongs to the people of Nigeria. These groups justify
their actions to kidnap, steal, and ransom for money as an act of social justice.
Another significant difference between the Somali and GoG piracy models is the physical
location of the attacks. The majority of the Somali attacks took place in either busy, oceangoing
shipping lanes designated as international waters or the Somali exclusive economic zone (EEZ),
which are specific jurisdictional zones in maritime law defined by UNCLOS. Since these cases
occur several hundred miles from shore, (further discussed in chapter 3) greater legal authority is
granted to international actors to respond with anti-piracy measures such as apprehension and
enforcement mechanisms. In contrast, as demonstrated by the figures and maps below, GoG
piracy is a much more localized issue. Attacks occur more frequently within the domestic
territorial waters of West African nations (less than 12 miles from shore) and even within the
internal waters of ports, rivers and delta waterways of these countries. For this reason, the
response and involvement of international actors is limited by established international maritime
law. Instead, greater authority and responsibility have fallen upon local West African
governments to protect high-valued foreign assets such as ships, drilling operations and people,
against the threats of piracy.
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Figure 3a

Figure 3b

West African Piracy and Armed Robbery (August 1995 – March 2014)
Location of incident
In international waters

158

In territorial waters

296

In port areas

389

Source: http://gisis.imo.org/Public/PAR/Reports.aspx?Name=RegionalAnalysis
Domestic and international political situations differ significantly between Somali and
GoG piracy. The notion of Somalia as a “failed state,” meaning that it was not functioning as an
adequate political authority, had great implications for the feasibility of anti-piracy responses by
the international community and the United Nations. However, West African nations in the GoG
region contain functioning government entities that claim authority and are granted responsibility
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to suppress criminal activities within their territories, such as piracy. This has created more
complex situations in international politics. Although recognized internationally as legitimate
entities, many of these governments are notorious for corruption, as well as lack the funds,
infrastructure and judicial systems necessary to suppress piracy and guarantee maritime security.
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Chapter 3
Complexities of Law, Justice, Politics and Terrorism
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Part I: The Successful Responses to Somali Piracy and Applicability in GoG
In his book Sea Power: The History and Geopolitics of the World's Oceans, Admiral
James Stavridis, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander charged with tackling Somali piracy,
cites four “key factors” for the success of the campaign. Each one of these key factors responded
to the specific physical and legal conditions of Somali piracy that create a sanctuary for pirates.
International intervention led to the restoration of authority both on the seas and in domestic
courtrooms. Specifically, Stavridis cites (1) effective law enforcement created by international
naval intervention in both international and Somali-territorial waters, (2) adequate defensive
mechanisms created by shipping industry initiatives such as private security, (3) successful
prosecution and administration of criminal justice by gaining access to local courts and applying
an appropriate international legal framework for trial proceedings, and (4) land-based prevention
through nation and infrastructure-building in Somalia. 68 This chapter examines the first three of
these responses in depth and explains why they were effective in suppressing piracy off the coast
in Somalia but have failed in the Gulf of Guinea. Comparing the conditions in Somalia and GoG
demonstrates why West African anti-piracy campaigns suffer from significant physical and legal
setbacks that hamper the application of the Somali model unto the GoG region.
(1) Creating Effective Law Enforcement
The international legal regime, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), defines unlawful piracy as an attack on the “high seas.” The “high seas” are
international zones beyond the established territorial waters of a state. As described in Chapter 2,
Somali pirates most frequently operated in shipping lanes hundreds of miles offshore and well
within international waters. Because these attacks on the “high seas” thus fit the legal definition
68
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of unlawful piracy, state courts that had adopted the UNCLOS criteria could proceed with
courtroom trials (discussed in the next section). In addition, the “universal jurisdiction” principle
allows foreign and multinational navies to actively patrol international waters, lawfully seize
vessels, and apprehend pirates caught in the act. During the peak of Somali piracy, this allowed
for “Combined Task Force 151,” an international naval coalition “consisting of warships from
the twenty-eight nations of NATO, the European Union, and a loose coalition of Gulf State
navies” to police and protect maritime traffic from piracy. 69 Other international players, such as
Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Iran, also contributed to the anti-piracy campaign. 70 This
unprecedented and colossal international force created a sufficient pool of resources, such as
long-range aircraft, radar, communication and well-trained personnel, to ensure effective law
enforcement in the Horn of Africa.
The predominant location of attacks within the local territorial waters of West African
states, however, makes anti-piracy law more complex. The location of this piracy “hotspot”
significantly limits the international response and challenges the “high seas” definition of piracy
under international law. As shown in Figure 3, less than a quarter of incidents occurred in
international waters between 1995 and 2014. These attacks, therefore, do not constitute the
guidelines of international piracy under UNCLOS requirements and instead fall under local
jurisdiction. Only if the domestic laws of each individual nation define them as properly and
sufficiently as piracy, can perpetrators be prosecuted. 71 In regards to law enforcement,
international navies have no authority to police, seize or apprehend pirates acting within these
territorial waters. Instead, local West African nations have the sole legal authority and
69
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responsibility to regulate this criminal activity. This reality is particularly troublesome when
considering that piracy impacts international shipping, global commodities markets, and foreign
actors. International security experts such as Martin N. Murphy recognize that piracy and crime
flourish when weak states fail to deny useful sanctuaries, or “safe havens,” for organized
criminal groups. 72 The maritime security and anti-piracy measures taken by local West African
nations have proven to be greatly ineffective, providing pirates with sanctuaries in which to
thrive. This ineffectiveness is categorized by weak governance in both law enforcement and
court systems (discussed in a later section).
Scholars and international shippers often blame weak governance within law enforcement
for contributing to maritime insecurity in the region. Critics point out that several local states,
predominantly the Nigerian government, are both unwilling (highly corrupt) and unable (lack of
resources and infrastructure) to lead proper anti-piracy campaigns and contain pirates within
their own waters and jurisdiction. Historically prone to bribes and payoffs, the Nigerian
government consistently ranks among the most corrupt in the world. In a 2006 global corruption
index, it scored a 2.2 out of 10 (0- highly corrupt, 10- very clean). Murphy makes a strong case
for the relationship between corruption and piracy, claiming “forces nominally responsible” for
containing piracy are often “in a league with pirates,” allowing organized criminal pirates to
often “enjoy the support of those in power.” 73 Similarly, West African maritime security analyst
Herbert Anyiam believes that bribery and collusion between pirates and port authorities and
officials “charged with upholding the law” are a major factor in supporting rather than
suppressing GoG piracy. 74 Despite Nigerian president Muhammadu Buhari’s promises to clean
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up the corruption, many critics argue that West African governments simply do not have the
resources, naval capacity or infrastructure to provide proper surveillance and an effective antipiracy response. These critics demand local nations to invest “more heavily in modern
technology,” such as surveillance devices, aircraft and high-speed boats, and take greater
responsibility in securing their internal waters and port facilities. Using quantitative data,
Freedom C. Onuoha makes a strong case. He notes that due to on-shore regional political
insecurity, West African nations invest greatly in land-based armies while neglecting “maritime
security forces such as navy, air force and coast guards.” 75 This lack of attention leaves these
segments “ill-equipped and underfunded to perform” sufficient anti-piracy operations. 76
Although Somali attacks predominantly took place in international waters that could be
lawfully policed, the pirates would occasionally retreat with captured vessels and crew into
Somali territorial waters. Using “safe haven” ports outside of international jurisdiction, the under
functioning Somali authorities would do nothing to stop the pirate activities. This dilemma was
addressed and resolved through a firm decision by the United Nations Security Council. Using
the classification of Somalia as a “failed-state” as justification, the UN Security Council adopted
Resolution 1816 (2008) to allow an alteration to the UNCLOS jurisdictional guidelines. The
resolution declared that “States cooperating with the country’s transitional Government would be
allowed, for a period of six months [this period was officially renewed several times, SC] to
enter the territorial waters of Somalia and use “all necessary means” to repress acts of piracy and
armed robbery at sea.” 77 The international community accepted the decision despite some
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objections to sovereignty infringement. Consent from the Somali Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) for assistance against unruly pirate gangs was a key factor in the acceptance.
In the Gulf of Guinea, however, no similar resolutions allowing direct international
participation seem likely. Weak but functioning West African governments have shown little
interest in allowing foreign navies to police their waters. Concession of authority to lawfully
seize domestic vessels suspected of piracy would greatly infringe upon the sovereignty of their
governments and threaten national security. The United Nations and foreign actors have
therefore desperately pressured and encouraged West African nations to step up their local antipiracy initiatives. In August 2013, for example, the President of the Security Council pleaded for
“States of the region to counter the threat of piracy.” The statement formally “recognizes the
primary responsibility of States” under international law to address piracy in their territorial
waters and “stresses that the coordination of efforts at the regional level is key.” 78 The UN also
encourages the international community to assist in “capacity-building” in West African nations
to “improve their infrastructure and ensure their ability to more effectively carry out joint
(regional) enforcement, monitoring and patrolling at sea.” 79 Since Resolution 2039 (2012), which
first addressed the issue of GoG piracy, many foreign governments have contributed indirectly
through the process of “capacity building.” The international community has offered funds, such
as the IMO West and Central Africa Maritime Security Trust Fund, and cooperative naval and
coast guard training exercises, such as 2018 Obangame Express in which 31 nations participated.
Foreign governments also make contributions to modern technology and naval weaponry to
indirectly bolster regional anti-piracy initiatives. Despite these efforts, however, piracy in the
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region continues to rise. International critics forced to sit on the sidelines continue to ask what
more can be done to ensure the effective protection of their vessels and citizens.
(2) Defensive Mechanisms and Shipping Industry Initiatives
Admiral James Stavridis briefly discusses the use of defensive mechanisms led by the
international shipping industry as another key factor in the elimination of Somali piracy. He
emphasizes two mechanisms in particular: cooperation in reporting/information sharing
techniques and the use of onboard private security forces. These mechanisms require voluntary
initiative by the international shipping community and private shipping companies and therefore
are generally outside the scope of this legal argument. However, the use of pirate security teams
as a feasible response to GoG piracy has been obstructed by local laws.
For vessels transiting international waters during the height of Somali piracy, armed
private security contractors became effective means of last-resort defense. Shipping companies
began employing teams of two to six private security personnel, generally well-armed and
trained. It became an acceptable practice in international waters despite liability concerns and the
legal ambiguity surrounding rules of engagement. 80 Stavaris boasts that “no ship embarking an
armed security detail has ever been successfully hijacked,” as pirates often avoided further
confrontation with ships that returned fire. 81 On the other hand, the statutes regulating the carry
of live firearms on merchant vessels in West African nations block the use of private security
teams. Critics looking for a quick solution to GoG piracy, such as maritime security analyst
Mikhail Voytenko, therefore demand that these nations make laws more flexible to allow for
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private security. However, the argument is somewhat hypocritical considering most nations
develop laws regulating the carry of firearms across borders and within their territories.
(3) Criminal Justice in Court
Stavaris notes that “the hardest part of the operation was actually what occurred after we
caught a pirate.” 82 Successful criminal conviction has been a challenge in many cases of modern
piracy, and even initially for Somali suspects. In assessing the prosecution of pirates, Waseem
Ahmad Qureshi observes that in general “the number of prosecutions and convictions of pirates
is very low compared to the number of incidents of piracy reported and to the numbers of pirates
apprehended.” 83 Although UNCLOS provides a legal framework that clarifies definitions and
conditions of anti-piracy law, it does not establish courts with international jurisdiction. Article
105 reads “The Courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties
to be imposed.” 84 To facilitate judicial proceedings, piracy must be clearly defined and outlawed
in domestic legal systems and then legal action must be taken (and carried through) against
suspects. A major flaw in UNCLOS is that it does not contain a legislative requirement forcing
all states to create domestic laws to suppress piracy. 85 Legal scholars view the inclusion of piracy
into domestic legislation as “imperative” for effective prosecution, as universal jurisdiction alone
is insufficient. 86 The lack of legislation that reconciles domestic and international laws and other
weaknesses in judicial procedure have weakened the response to Somalia and West African
piracy.
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Many suspects of Somali piracy were lawfully captured in international waters by foreign
States. These ethnic Somalis usually carried no papers, and evidence such as weapons and
scaling ladders were often disposed of prior to boarding, creating problems for the probable
cause of international arrest under universal jurisdiction. 87 Because many claimed to be innocent
fishermen, suspects often had to be “caught in the act” in order to be adequately prosecuted. 88
Based on Article 105, the next question became what to do with the suspects. The incapacity of
the “failed-state” Somalia government to offer a functioning judicial system meant the transfer of
suspects back to domestic Somali courts was not a viable option. Arresting States were therefore
forced to incur significant costs to transport, conduct domestic trials, and imprison the suspects.
In addition, arresting States had to take into consideration international human rights treaties
regarding international custody, as the failure to do so invalidated convictions on multiple
occasions. 89 Faced with these challenges, foreign forces were often obliged to “catch and
release” pirates, creating a system in which the lack of criminal justice offered no form of
deterrent.
Responding to this challenge, the international community found a solution by entering
legal extradition agreements allowing the transfer of suspects into the custody of fullyfunctioning, regional East African states such as Kenya. Initial trials set a precedent that under
universal jurisdiction, Kenyan magistrates’ courts may “proceed with piracy prosecutions against
non-nationals captured outside the country.” 90 Furthermore, the Merchant Shipping Act (2009)
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fully adopted international legal definitions of piracy that allowed for effective prosecution. 91
Under these conditions, Kenya soon “became a primary destination for the prosecution of pirates
captured off the coast of Somalia.” 92 The domestic courts of Mauritius, Tanzania, and Seychelles
would also play a role in prosecuting Somali pirates. 93 Despite criticism that Kenyan Courts
became a “pirate dumping-ground,” these extradition agreements offered a solution to the lack of
criminal justice in Somalia and the Courts maintained acceptable international standards of
piracy prosecution.
In West African states, however, the lack of legislative and judicial capacity to bring
pirates to justice continues to be a major issue. The sidelined international community has
continuously urged these nations to update anti-piracy legislation to allow for effective judicial
proceedings. In April 2016, the statement from the President of the Security Council
demonstrates this message, calling “upon States in the region to criminalize piracy and armed
robbery at sea under their domestic law” and “formulate a legal framework against piracy.” 94
But the problem of corruption continues to have a significant impact on local piracy hearings.
This corruption fits more broadly the issue of complex and unstable regional politics, which
undermine law and order.

Part II: Considerations
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The “Private Ends” Requirement and Terrorism
An additional question that arises while discussing the political challenges to West
African piracy is its relationship to terrorism. The “private ends” requirement in UNCLOS has
created considerable legal debate over the application of anti-piracy law, as well as the role of
terrorism and social justice in modern piracy. The international community, for example, drew a
connection between Somali pirate profits and terrorist funding to justify the costs of intervention
and guarantee of maritime security. The social and political conditions in GoG facilitate an even
stronger connection, even direct involvement, between radical groups and piracy. The term
“resource-insurgency” has been used to describe the political nature of West African piracy. This
debate also questions the sufficiency of the “private ends” requirement and therefore the
application of UNCLOS.
Defining terrorism has proven to be a challenge for international law. Although the
international community has not agreed on a definition, NATO forces define an act of terrorism
as any use of force “in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies.” 95 In regards
to piracy, Martin N. Murphy makes a clear distinction between terrorists and pirates based on
their objectives. He classifies pirates as “common criminals” who are motivated by private
economic gain, whereas “terrorists” strive for public coercion through violence and intimidation.
Under this distinction, cooperation between pirates and terrorists does not lead to terrorism
unless it intends to coerce the public or a government. Furthermore, even the classification of a
group or individual as “terrorist” is insufficient to determine that an act of piracy is terrorism,
even if it is used to generate revenue for political causes. In Kidnap and Ransom, Richard
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Clutterbuck also discusses the relationship between the common crime and terrorist. He agrees
that “some definition is needed which differentiates between… ‘criminal’ and ‘political’ groups”
based on their “primary aim.” 96 He implies that all terrorists are criminals under the law, but
certainly not all criminals are terrorists. Clutterbuck notes, however, that “their aims, as well as
their activities, often overlap.” 97
Consensus in the international community classified pirates gangs in Somalia as criminal
but not terrorist. This assessment was based on the identity of pirates, their objectives, and to
what extent these objectives were political in nature. It was soon determined that Somali pirates
were impoverished ethnic Somalis who claimed no explicit ties to any political authority. The
crimes were economically-motivated; desperate pirates indiscriminately attacked passing ships
and demanded lucrative ransom payments to sustain themselves and their families. But Murphy
acknowledges that, although separate entities, terrorists and common criminals occasionally find
reason for cooperation. It was a suspected pirate-terrorist financial relationship in Somali that
began to trouble foreign states. Despite the lack of concrete evidence, many nations justified
intervention and the cost of policing waters off East Africa, fearing that profitable ransoms
funded Al Shabaab and other local terrorist groups. The International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999) was drawn upon when considering the
regulation of pirates. In Resolution 2383 (2017), which emphasizes a commitment to the
suppression of Somali piracy, the UNSC notes that piracy “exacerbates instability in Somalia by
introducing large amounts of illicit cash that fuels additional crime, corruption and terrorism.” 98

96

Richard Clutterbuck, Kidnap And Ransom: The Response (London: Faber and Faber, 1979) pg 27
Ibid.
98
United Nations Security Council, UN Resolution 2383 (2017).
97

45

The extension of political instability onto the sea, what Murphy calls “maritime
disorder,” and the increase in kidnapping tactics has sparked debate over the role terrorism and
political objectives play in GoG piracy. Nigerian political scientist Freedom C. Onuoha uses the
term “resource-insurgency” to describe the situation of maritime insecurity in Nigeria. The term
demonstrates that criminal and terrorist activities overlap significantly. In an attempt to uphold
this distinction, Murphy notes that terrorist organizations occasionally deviate towards economic
crimes as a means for financing political objectives. 99 In the GoG, political and economic
objectives drive one another in a region prone to power struggle, corruption and poverty. Those
in power dominate the means of income and production, yet severe economic inequality creates
incentive for social and political uprising that demands radical change and social justice. Radical
militant groups such as the Niger Delta Avengers target offshore oil platforms, claiming that the
oil companies and multinationals exploit Nigerian wealth. 100 These groups also use strong antigovernment rhetoric and demand independence from the government of Nigeria. Clutterbuck
notes that “political terrorists dedicated to liberation and equality are often unable to resist the
temptation to embezzle some of the proceeds of ransoms.” 101 Despite “Strike Force” guerrilla
teams aiming the outright destruction of oil-related property and infrastructure, 102 criminal
activities considered piracy are used to satisfy both economic and political objectives of these
groups. These activities include oil bunkering, theft of petroleum products, and kidnapping for
ransom.

99

Murphy, CONTEMPORARY PIRACY, pgs 76-77
Agbinibo, Mudoch. "ENOUGH OF THIS INJUSTICE." Niger Delta Avengers. June 09, 2016. Accessed April 15,
2018. http://www.nigerdeltaavengers.org/2016.
101
Clutterbuck, Kidnap and Ransom, pg 27.
102
Agbinibo, “ENOUGH OF THIS INJUSTICE.”
100

46

A case can be made that the evolution of piracy tactics in the GoG demonstrates that
pirates are becoming more inclined to chase private economic gains. Murphy contends that
terrorist groups occasionally transition into fully criminal organizations. 103 Likeminded scholars
and analysts agree that prior to recent trends, the principal method of piracy in the GoG was the
“theft of crude oil and refined petroleum products.” 104 Recent deviation towards taking human
hostages for ransom payments demonstrates that pirates have found an easier and more lucrative
alternative for generating income. In addition, the target has changed drastically from oil related
infrastructure, in which original political grievances were contained, to general merchant
shipping. Perhaps this change indicates that profit-making drives piracy as an economic crime in
the GoG.
The possible connections between terrorism and piracy do not necessarily alter the
effectiveness of criminal justice in the GoG. International jurists have widened the definition of
piracy as an act committed for “private ends.” It is now also possible to persecute pirates if it can
be determined they acted for public means. Under The Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation of 1988, the law “goes one step further
than the UNCLOS by including political offenses within the scope of piracy.” 105 In addition, this
Convention creates a legislative requirement upon ratification, meaning parties have to
implement these provisions into domestic law. Therefore, any attacks against vessels and oil
infrastructure are defined under international law as piracy regardless of the motive.
The lack of enforcement, however, exposes the complexity of local politics and unfair
treatment of political actors. Government officials and politicians have been known to grant
103

Murphy, CONTEMPORARY PIRACY, pgs 76-77
Ofosu-Boateng, “Methodological Responses,” pg 241.
105
Qureshi, “The prosecution of pirates,” pg 99.
104

47

amnesty to individuals of insurgent forces and militant groups in exchange for cease-fire
agreements. The Nigerian government, for example, granted militant leader Oweizide
Ekpemupolo amnesty of all previous crimes, even though his organization has openly claimed
responsibility for numerous attacks on oil platforms and commercial ships. Ekpemupolo’s
treatment demonstrates the recurring theme that local politics and corruption often interfere with
pirate criminal justice, creating impunity and hampering accountability. Murphy and Clutterbuck
agree that a distinction must remain between political and economically-motivated crimes to
deter piracy and theft and keep crime equitable under the law.
Lastly, Somali piracy demonstrates that political objectives and terrorism have great
implications on the international community’s urgency to suppress groups responsible for piracy.
The term “terrorism” tends to be a trigger word for international intervention. Foreign
governments were quick to step in when they became suspicious about piracy profits and alShabab funding. Additionally, the connection was used to justify billions of dollars spent on the
campaign. On the other hand, extremist and militant groups directly partake in piracy to fund
their political objectives in the Gulf of Guinea. As instances of kidnapping increase, it will be
interesting to see if the international community again pulls the terrorist card in West Africa,
creating a greater sense of urgency for addressing piracy in the region.
National Sovereignty versus Universal Jurisdiction
Jurists as early as the Romans considered “open” (international) and “closed” (territorial)
waters and the legal implications of each. 106 Vattel noted “it is no easy thing” to determine at
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which point the restricted waters near land become free and common waters. 107 Numerous
contemporary scholars have responded to the current struggle between universal jurisdiction on
the high seas and the protection of sovereignty. Due to current conditions of piracy, some
advocate amending current international law and the UNCLOS code. These alterations would
affect the rights, duties and jurisdiction of coastal states and foreign actors.
A notable argument calls for adjusting the “high seas” requirement of international piracy
and applying universal jurisdiction to any navigable water on earth, including territorial and
internal waters, appealing to the notion that “civilization ends at the waterline.” The Kenyan
Appellate Court, Judge David Maraga notes that “[e]very state has interest of bringing to justice
perpetrators of International Crimes including piracy, genocide, apartheid and human
trafficking.” 108 These actions relate to a contemporary topic of international law concerning
international “crimes against humanity.” In the Pinochet case involving torture and international
law, Lord Millett notes crimes that demand universal jurisdiction are “so serious and on such as
scale that they can justly be regarded as an attack on the international legal order.” 109 The
sovereignty of a state therefore may be obliged to administer criminal justice upon an individual.
These universal crimes “cannot be considered purely the internal matters of sovereign states.” 110
Under a similar argument the International Criminal Court has developed jurisdiction to try such
offenses in recent years but does not currently handle cases of piracy. Article 17 of the Rome
Statute grants jurisdiction to the ICC for cases in which “the State is unwilling or unable
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genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.” 111 Very similar language has been used
to criticize the response to piracy by regional authorities in the GoG. The elimination of the
“high seas” requirement would expand the reach of international jurisdiction under this
argument.
Article 100 of UNCLOS mandates that all states “cooperate to the fullest possible extent
in the repression of piracy,” 112 but there are several issues with this obligation. This duty applies
to the current definition of piracy which is limited to activity on the “high seas.” Article 17,
however, affirms the right of foreign vessels to innocent passage through the territorial waters of
a coastal state. 113 An argument can be made that coastal states should have a legal obligation or
duty under international law to protect the “freedom of innocent passage” from infringement
since international jurisdiction is limited in these regions. Yet even if article 100 was adjusted to
all navigable waters, however, issues arise regarding the enforcement, accountability and
definition of an obligation on an individual state to act “to the fullest possible extent.”
Elimination of the “high seas” requirement is controversial and unlikely. The original
guideline for delineation of territorial waters was a 3-nautical mile belt based on the “cannon
shot” rule. The length of one cannon shot determined the portion, or breadth, of an ocean that a
sovereign state could defend from shore. 114 This guideline was later expanded to a limit of 12nautical miles and codified in future multilateral treaties such as UNCLOS. With the introduction
of modern technology allowing for greater surveillance and enforcement, arguments are made
that the delineation boundaries of state territorial waters should actually be expanded, not
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rescinded. The expansion of universal jurisdiction regarding piracy thus contradicts this call for
increasing the boundaries of territorial waters and exposes the discrepancy in the capabilities of
nations to properly regulate their waters. The struggle between foreign intervention and national
sovereignty demonstrates why interested nations are currently taking an indirect “capacitybuilding” approach to bolster maritime security.
Perhaps an outcome for the expansion of universal jurisdiction may be to adjust the “high
seas” requirement of the piracy definition while keeping current restrictions on the physical law
enforcement capacity (i.e. exclude the right of seizure) of foreign states within delineated
territorial waters. This system would assist weak states only with issues involving criminal
justice. West African states with ineffective legal systems could “refer” suspects to international
or mixed tribunals designed to prosecute pirates under the standards of international maritime
law. The ICC is an example of an international court that works on a referral basis, accepting
cases when “a state is unwilling or unable to carry out the investigation or prosecution.” 115
Additionally, extradition treaties transferring suspects to domestic courts of foreign nations,
following the example set by Kenya in Somali piracy, would assist West African nations in
taking effective legal action.
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Conclusion

“Are there, in this world, any parties, any forces, sensible, responsible and
influential enough to radically change the situation in the Gulf of Guinea?“
- Mikhail Voytenko, Maritime Security Analysis, February 2, 2018
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The evolution of international maritime law has led to the state-sponsored protection of
neutral shipping and innocent passage at sea. Codification provides clarity for states regarding
their duties and rights as members of the international regime. Piracy law was created to deter
crime and protect the infringement of innocent passage. The law developed uniquely to address
the common use of the maritime region and its nature as an uninhabitable space. Since ancient
times, piracy has been deemed to be a crime that challenged political and economic
organizations and therefore affected all of humanity. Pirates were seen as international criminals
acting “against the law of nations” and “community of human beings.” 116 International
lawmakers developed the principle of universal jurisdiction, allowing governments to enforce
anti-piracy in international waters.
The delineation provisions of UNCLOS have created a struggle between preserving
national sovereignty and affirming international jurisdiction. The current situation in the Gulf of
Guinea exemplifies this struggle as limitations of international law have contributed to the
creation of a sanctuary for piracy. Despite weak domestic authority in Somalia, the international
community was able to intervene and undermine pirate safe havens partly because international
law was adjusted to address the local situation. In West Africa, however, piracy has persevered,
and is now increasing and becoming more problematic. The weakness and inability of domestic
authorities to manage internal and territorial waters combined with the inability of the
international community to intervene lawfully have hampered the suppression of piracy in the
Gulf of Guinea.
The sanctuary or “safe haven” predicament in international security demonstrates that
weak authority allows for piracy to occur when incentivized by land-based push factors. In the
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GoG, states with weak authority are unable and unwilling to capture pirates and hold them
accountable. A lack of resources, infrastructure, surveillance technology, legislative/judicial
incapacity, volatile politics, and corruption account for this incapacity. The stubborn existence of
privateering in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, despite animosity towards piracy by
political authorities, demonstrates that sanctuaries for piracy can also derive from ambiguity in
international maritime law itself. The scenario also demonstrates the imperfections of
international law in general and the constant need for evolution and adaptation. The Gulf of
Guinea is a contemporary example of a sustained pirate sanctuary.
Somali piracy responses have taught us that domestic and international law must rely on
each other for anti-piracy law to be effective in court. UNCLOS definitions of piracy have
proven to be the legal backbone for the prosecution of international pirates. International codes,
however, are theoretical and insufficient, unless applied to domestic legislation and courtrooms.
Domestic systems have the primary role and responsibility of administering justice in cases of
international piracy. Kenya and other East African states effectively adopted international
standards for anti-piracy law and took on this role while the Somali government was absent.
West African nations, conversely, have been criticized for insufficient anti-piracy law and weak
court systems. A legislative requirement upon States that ratify UNCLOS would address this
issue by forcing international piracy standards into domestic law. Yet even the United States,
which has not ratified the treaty itself, has applied UNCLOS anti-piracy provisions to domestic
courts by recognizing it as customary international law. Therefore, West African states could
also take greater initiative in creating domestic legal frameworks to ensure maritime security.
On February 1st, Panama-flagged tanker Marine Express was hijacked by pirates while at
anchor off the coast of Benin. The very next day, in an emotional monologue, maritime security
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analyst and blogger Mikhail Voytenko demanded: “Are there, in this world, any parties, any
forces, sensible, responsible and influential enough to radically change the situation in the Gulf
of Guinea?“ 117 Piracy remains a menace and concern for many reasons. It affects commerce and
bears costs upon international markets. Inherent violence and kidnapping methods threaten
members of the seafaring community. Despite the immediate need to restore order and authority,
we must also address the root causes of piracy. After all, modern piracy is a crime perpetrated by
desperate, underprivileged members of society responding to poor living conditions and lack of
land-based opportunity. Even Admiral James Stavridis, a self-proclaimed “pirate hunter,”
recognizes that combating piracy requires “additional work ashore by the international
community” addressing poverty, inequality and other conditions “that lead young men to take up
a dangerous and chaotic lifestyle.” 118
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